In this work, we propose the construction of a evaluative framework for supporting experts in questioned signature examinations. Through the use of Bayesian networks, we envision to quantify the probative value of well defined measurements performed on questioned signatures, in a way that is both formalised and part of a coherent approach to evaluation. At the current stage, our project is explorative, focusing on the broad range of aspects that relate to comparative signature examinations. The goal is to identify writing features which are both highly discriminant, and easy for forensic examiners to detect. We also seek for a balance between case-specific features and characteristics which can be measured in the vast majority of signatures. Care is also taken at preserving the interpretability at every step of the reasoning process. This paves the way for future work, which will aim at merging the different contributions to a single probabilistic measure of strength of evidence using Bayesian networks. (L. Gaborini).
Introduction
Handwritten signatures have been employed since centuries as a means of authenticating one's identity on official documents. Their study has been one of the oldest disciplines in forensic science, yet its evaluative part did not achieve the same level of refinement as others.
Several professional groups, such as questioned document examiners, are trained to testify in courts by following established examination protocols for handwritten signatures. However, the usage of handwritten evidence in courts raises a number of issues. The scientific foundations of forensic handwriting comparisons are regularly doubted, in particular the mechanism by which forensic examiners arrive at and state their conclusions is often questioned. Specifically, the evaluation process is highly expert dependent and does not rely on standardized measurements and lines of reasoning, being thus highly dependent on the skill and proficiency of each examiner.
The use of forensic science in legal proceedings is based on the so-called "evaluative" framework: instead of stating a probability for a hypothesis, forensic experts report an expression of strength of support against two competing hypotheses, of forensic and legal writing system [2] . For example, one may compare the writing features of a questioned item against those of two individuals, a number of suspects, or any other set of potential writers. If the relevant population spans a restricted number of individuals, the comparison is said to be a "closed-set": on the other hand, if the population at large is considered, the situation is labelled "open-set" [3] .
As a result, the value of the scientific findings strongly depends on their rarity in the reference population, though some traits might be more discriminating between two individuals rather than among a broader group of writers.
In this article, we mostly focus on closed-set circumstances, leaving the possibility to extend to open-set situations in future works.
Elements of Bayesian networks
To depict the reasoning using the previously illustrated interpretative framework, consider a single variable H which can assume two mutually exclusive states H p and H d , respectively the prosecution and the defence hypothesis. In a questioned signature examination scenario, we may associate e.g., H p = "Person A has written the questioned signature" and H d = "An unknown person has written the questioned signature". Let E be the set of findings, as detected by the expert (e.g., similarities and differences between the questioned signature and the reference specimens). We denote with I the background information on the case, available to the expert.
Relevant to the recipient of expert information are the prior beliefs on H p and H d , conditioned by the background information: these are the probabilities Pr(H = h p | I) and Pr(H = h d | I), respectively 1 . More precisely, their ratio (called prior odds) is the relative strength of belief in H a priori.
The role of the expert is to evaluate the probability of having observed E under h p and h d : these terms are Pr(E|H = h p , I) and Pr(E|H = h p , I), respectively.
Bayes' theorem then states that the relative strength of belief in H a posteriori is proportional to the prior odds. In formulae: is called likelihood ratio. We observe that LR provides the expression for the strength of support of E versus the considered H: if LR > 1, E provides more support to h p rather than h d , conditioned on the background information, and vice versa. Notice that it does not imply that h p is more probable than h d . To dissect the definition of the LR, the numerator reads as the probability of having observed E under h p : referring to the previous example, it amounts to asking "what is the probability of observing the set of concordances and discordances in genuine signatures of Person A?". The denominator, instead, is the probability of observing the same set of findings in signatures that appear to belong to Person A, but instead have been forged by someone else: this is assessed using the relevant population, defined in Section 1.1. In other terms, the LR is the ratio of two probabilities that account for, respectively, the intra-and inter-variability of findings. Note that to apply the evaluative framework, one needs to specify not only the numerical values for the beliefs, but also the dependencies between the variables in terms of conditional probabilities. This can be intuitively represented in a graphical notation, which enables the forensic scientist to consider cases with multiple variables with differing interdependence. The obtained graphs are named Bayesian networks [4] : for instance, the previous example can be represented in Fig. 1 . Note that the background information I is used to condition all relevant probabilities associated to H and E. For the sake of simplicity, such dependence is generally just assumed without a clear representation in the network. As a consequence, information I is usually omitted from explicit graphical representation in Bayesian networks. Bayesian networks are very flexible, and have been used to support evaluative reasoning in very different forensic branches such as firearms [5] , printed documents [6] , signatures [7] , forensic medicine [8] and DNA [9] . A review on the usage of Bayesian networks in forensic science can be found in Ref. [10] .
Hierarchical evidence evaluation
A Bayesian network can be built for a rather generic evaluative procedure (e.g., the two-trace problem in Ref. [11] ), but its structure can also be modified in order to accommodate for missing evidence [10] . Specifically, a binary-valued node M can be added to the network, encoding the fact that some evidence E is expected, but has not been retrieved (i.e., is missing). The usual assessments on the probability of E are now conditional on M.
The flexibility of Bayesian networks allows us to assess the probative value in complex cases, using evidence which is more and more case-based. In the works described later on, we envision to build a useful model to capture the essential features of the process of signature comparison, to help evaluating evidence which can always be measured (e.g., physical dimensions of the signatures) up to specific traits of one's signature (e.g., inner angles), which might not always be recognisable.
Related work

Pattern Recognition literature
A large amount of work has been recently done in building automatic classifiers for signatures. Most often, they exploit features which are not easy to describe (either empirically or mathematically), or have limited forensic interest. Such systems can be designed to work in a multi-writer environment, with known Table 1 Composition and notation of the corpora.
Writer 
Relative word spacing [0, 1]
Caps height ratio [0, 1]
Relative first name length [0, 1] or unknown sources. A number of literature review papers are available, such as Refs. [12] [13] [14] . Several international competitions of automated forensic handwriting analysis (AFHA) have also been organised, mostly related to ICDAR conferences: typically, they required participants to test their working systems on a common signature database, built specifically for the contest.
The literature distinguishes between studying on-line signatures (i.e., whose speed, acceleration and stroke-order data is recorded in real-time) and off-line signatures (i.e., where only the finished written signature is studied) [14] , but also classifies the signatures according to their "grade" of forgery. Since an automatic approach is sought, researchers frequently aim at distinguishing one's signature from another's, with no attempt at forgery (i.e., random forgery) [12] . If the forger is aware of the victim's name but signed in his own style, we talk about blind forgery; if the forger has obtained some genuine specimens and has actively tried to reproduce the victim's signature, one talks about skilled forgery.
However, our goal is not to build an entirely automatic system to classify signatures (which is the goal of AFHA discipline), but to find a means to support the forensic document examiner in his evaluation. A fully automatic approach would be useless to him, since, for example, by his expertise he would also consider a number of characteristics which are related to the context of the contested specimens (e.g., type of instrument, writing position, nature of document, secondary traces such as blood and fingermarks, and reasons behind a forgery): an automatic approach cannot deal with these characteristics, since they are necessarily tied to a specific forensic case. Moreover, works in Pattern Recognition literature achieve very high classification rates (see Table V in Ref. [14] ), but do so in a not forensically interesting environment, both due to the usage of different hypotheses (e.g., writing position, type of instrument and psychological conditions) and to the way in which conclusions are reported. They also typically make no reference to the chosen population under the defence hypothesis (see Section 1.1).
To reconnect with the Pattern Recognition nomenclature, the aim of this work is to study skilled forgeries in an off-line setting. However, the choice of features which will be examined and their integration into the evaluative framework is very different.
Forensic handwriting examination literature
As stated before, forensic handwriting examination is one of the oldest disciplines of forensic science. A great deal of literature is available on the subject, suggesting a number of traits of signatures and handwriting to be considered for evaluation: for example see Refs. [2, 15, 16, 17] and [18] . However, few of these works actually report quantitative means for obtaining measurements, and those who do have been often targets of criticism (see Refs. [19] and [20] ). Scarce progress was made in the quest for the formalisation of handwriting examinations until very recent years, with the advent of increasing computational power, refined mathematical techniques and sophisticated forensic tools. Among other works, we highlight Refs. [21] , [22] and [23] . Here, we chose to follow the initial part of Ref. [21] on signatures on paintings, for multiple reasons. Her work strives to achieve the same goals as ours, albeit in different contexts. The analysis of painted signatures deeply draws from the classical expertise in forensic document examination, on which our work will be based: as a consequence, the adopted features are related only to distances and angles inside each signature. The scope of Ref. [21] is mainly quantitative, and is aimed at building an evaluative procedure under the Bayesian framework.
In Ref. [23] , the authors illustrated a method to discriminate writers based on the shape of the capital letter "O", further extended to other characters in later works [24] [25] [26] . Specifically, loops of closed characters are described in terms of harmonic content of the shape contour, being thus easily classifiable by a set of numbers separating, e.g., "small, shaky and elongated loops" from "round and smooth circles". This method is striking in its match between simplicity and visual effectiveness, therefore we decided to adopt it as a part of our framework.
Notation
In this section, we define the notation that will be used in this work.
Where possible, upper-case letters will denote random variables (e.g., H), whose realisations are indicated with lower-case letters (e.g., H = h). Vectors will be underlined (e.g., X). We may also obtain a number of observations from a single random variable: the i-th realisation will be indicated with a parenthesized superscript. For
is a collection of n realisations of the random variable S.
In forensic literature, it is customary to specify the competing hypotheses by means of the variable H taking values in {H p , H d }, respectively for the prosecution and the defence. In light of previous remarks, H p and H d will then be indicated in lower-case notation (i.e., h p and h d ).
In this work, several signatures of a single person, denoted A, were analysed. In addition, a number of forged specimens were provided by several forgers. The latter are anonymously denoted by F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 4 . The set of all forgers is denoted with F All . We indicate the writer of the i-th specimen with the variable w (i) , taking values in W All = {A} ∪ F Al . Notice that w is supposed to be known, but it will be used only for ease of notation rather than inference.
Further definitions about the acquired corpora are given in Tables 1 and 2 .
Methodology
Signature acquisition: the corpora
143 signatures of a single person A were collected over the period of a month, writing in small batches to avoid hand fatigue and adaptation. All signatures have been written with a black ball-point pen on unruled white paper in a normal sitting position. As Ref. [27] reports, the absolute size of writing is deeply affected by available space, hence enough space has been left on the sides to prevent any restraining effect.
Forged samples were provided by 4 other persons, with no past experience in signature forgery and document examination. Each forger received the authentic corpus, and was instructed to practice forgeries to one's liking. Each forger reproduced at least 20 forgeries each over a week period, with a black pen in a normal sitting position. Tracing has been forbidden.
All collected signatures have been digitalized at 600 dpi and saved in an uncompressed grayscale format. The composition of the corpora is summarised in Table 1 .
Signature processing
As some features require the extraction of the contour and pixel values, each image needs to be further processed. Specifically, each signature is isolated from the background by means of a combination of morphological operators [28] . Consequently, each pixel of the image is either part of the background or of the signature.
As no guideline is provided onto the writing paper, signatures are rotated in order to compensate for the baseline inclination, evaluated by inspection. However, there were no cases in the corpora with extreme slant. This step is not necessary if only distance-based features (e.g., length of a particular ascender, and width of a word) are retained.
The implementation of Ref. [23] necessitates to locate closed loops in signatures. For each signature in the corpora, at most 5 loops were identified, each one attributable to the shape of single characters ("a", "b", "o"). Loops were closed by hand if a closure did not significantly alter their shape (i.e., very small opening, or the closing is strongly suggested by the surrounding character traits), while missing loops (i.e., either open or not present at all) were labelled as such. After normalizing the area of each loop, the contour was separated using morphological operators, and a vector of Fourier descriptors was extracted. 4 harmonics were retained, thereby producing 8 pairs of values (amplitude and phase) for each loop. Harmonics greater than the fifth order were discarded, as their shape contribution was visually negligible.
Keypoints and measures
Following Ref. [21] , 19 keypoints were hand picked in order to identify features which are both relevant to forensic examination, and easy to locate in the authentic signatures. The keypoints were afterwards matched in all corpora by human inspection. It is worthwhile noting that a given keypoint can fail to be present on a specimen: this information has been retained rather than discarded, and provides a further novelty in future works with respect to Ref. [21] .
The list of chosen keypoints is graphically represented in Fig. 2 , along with two samples from the corpora.
The set of keypoints serves as a basis to obtain measurements such as distances, angles, and ratios of distances. Such a list of measures is reported in Table 2 . To reduce the huge amount of measurements which can be extracted, we decided to initially focus only on those which can be reliably transposed to other kinds of signatures. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 1.3, features which are highly signature-dependent (such as H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , V 1 , V 2 ) can be integrated in the Bayesian network to provide further support to (or against) the hypotheses.
Results
Absolute dimensions
The simplest analysis which can be done is to study the absolute dimensions of signature samples, S 1 and S 2 . Collected data Confusion matrices across 5 different comparison scenarios. Hp  4  1 3 9  4  1 3 9  0  1 4 3  2  1 4 1  1 1  1 3 2  H d  79  17  34  1  20  0  18  3  18  2 is represented in Fig. 3 . It is evident that layman forgers were disregarding the absolute dimensions of the specimens, thereby producing forgeries with high probative value in favour of the hypothesis of forgery (rather than authenticity). The reasons are multiple: first of all, specimens were provided in an electronic format rather than in a printed form, impairing absolute visual comparisons between one's forgery and a genuine sample. Also, there were no visual guides on the document, to reduce the aforementioned restraining effect. Hence, the detected differences are tied to the mode of presentation of specimens to forgers. We nevertheless chose to report this analysis, as the method is applicable to any set of quantitative measurements performed on every specimen. As an example, we may repeat the same analyses on relative measurements (i.e., measurements which are independent of absolute sizes).
From Fig. 3 , the visual clustering of signature dimensions suggests us to treat them as samples from k bivariate Gaussians, where k = 5 (i.e., number of writers in the corpora).
According to Bayes' theorem (see Section 1.2), in the numerator of the LR, the variability of the signature dimensions is assessed in the genuine signatures. In a real-world forensic context, as stated in Section 1.1, one needs to specify the defence hypothesis, hence the population of interest (denoted with F ). The probability of the evidence under the defence hypothesis appears as the denominator of the LR.
We consider the following hypotheses: H = h p = "The questioned signature has been written by A ′′ vs H = h d = "The questioned signature has been written by someone in F ".
If two writers need to be compared, our corpora are able to produce 4 kinds of comparisons with the reference material, one for each forger (i.e. {A vs F i } 4 i=1 ). In that case, F is represented by the corpus produced by the considered forger.
If the number of potential writers remains unknown, however, the 5-class comparison problem becomes a two-class comparison problem, i.e., "authentic" (H = h p ) vs "forged" (H = h d ). In the latter case, F = F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , F 4 = F All i.e., under h d , we state that a signature has been produced by one of the F . Notice that we consider writers in F as being "indistinguishable" from each other, as they are grouped together under a single distribution, the one under h d . In other words, we consider forged specimens as having been written by a single "virtual" writer F All . We also observe that, under the latter, the Gaussian structure under h d cannot be assumed in our corpora.
To simulate a real-world comparison procedure, we performed a leave-one out cross-validation. From the corpora, we extracted a questioned signature; the remaining part will serve as the training data, which is used to infer the various distributional parameters. The questioned signature is finally evaluated against the updated distributions, thereby producing a LR value. This procedure is repeated until the corpora are exhausted, thereby producing n = 239 LR values. We expect to obtain LRs > 1 in the authentic corpus, and LRs < 1 otherwise.
In the light of previous remarks, we collect S 1 and S 2 in a vector, and we model the vector S = (S 1 , S 2 ) as follows:
where h ∈{h p , h d } is value of the considered hypothesis (H = h p in authentic signatures, H = h d otherwise), and l h , S h are respectively the maximum likelihood estimates of the mean and the covariance matrix under h. By abuse of notation, we will write, e.g., l p instead of l hp . In short, the model is the following:
We are assuming that signature dimensions are temporally indistinguishable (i.e., there is no dependence on i), and their distribution corpora can be fully described with a mean vector, and a covariance matrix. The model (1) is represented as a Bayesian network in Fig. 4 . The LR value is computed by evaluating the probability density function of the questioned pair (S 1 , S 2 ) under the competing hypotheses. In formulae: where l p , S p , l d , S d have been estimated using the remaining parts of the considered corpora (i.e., for the i-th LR, all specimens with indexes {j : w j = A ∧ j ̸ = i} under h p , and all specimens with indexes j : w j ∈ F ∧ j ̸ = i under h d ).
In Fig. 5 , we show the LR obtained for each specimen under two comparison scenarios. Notice the very large LR values: this may be due to the fact that in our model there is no uncertainty on the parameters of the Gaussian distributions, as we substituted their respective maximum likelihood estimates. Tippett plots for all scenarios are reported in Fig. 6 , while corresponding confusion matrices are reported in Table 3 .
Notice that in order to produce a fully Bayesian model, in Eq. (1) we should specify a prior on l h , S h and the hypothesis H. [30] For this study, however, we substituted the maximum likelihood estimates in their corpora, as performed in Ref. [31] : this both simplifies the reasoning, and greatly reduces the amount of calculations which have to be computed. A fully Bayesian modelling can be attempted to account for parameter uncertainty, as done in Refs. [30, [32] [33] [34] .
A further possible extension is to also infer |F | (i.e., the number of forgers in the corpora), and the individual characteristics of each writer. The fully Bayesian tools of choice are Dirichlet Process Mixture Models [35] .
Sensitivity to data set size
To investigate on the sensitivity of the method introduced in Section 5.1, we conducted a sensitivity analysis of the LR on the particular choice of the data set. Specifically, instead of using the entire authentic corpus to estimate the population parameters (l p and S p ), we considered smaller random subsets of specimens of increasing size (8 sizes being {5, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30, 50 , 90}, while the authentic corpus has size 143). For each subset size, we repeated the analysis 10 times, each time choosing a new subset, thus obtaining 10 × 8 = 80 likelihood ratios for each specimen, for a fixed F (the set of possible forgers). An averaged LR can be formed by combining the 10 repetitions for each image and for each subset size. The arithmetic mean of such repetitions has been indicated with the symbolLR. It is worthwhile noting that it is possible to perform other kinds of aggregations, such as majority voting. Large sample properties, however, do not change.
Only the authentic corpus has been subsampled for two reasons. First, the forged corpora are already very small with respect to the authentic corpus (see Table 1 ): a further resampling could introduce artifacts in the obtained distributions. Secondly, this enables us to approach data set sizes which are more commonly encountered in practical cases: e.g., we computed the likelihood ratios by comparing 20 authentic specimens and 20 forgeries.
To summarise the sensitivity results, we use Tippett plots shown in Fig. 7 . To ease interpretation, we have only shown the averaged likelihood ratioLR: also, the tails of the distributions have been cut off to highlight the increasing spread for smaller data set sizes. Notice how the likelihood ratio is more sensitive for forgers who produced forgeries with more variable sizes (e.g., F 2 ). Also, it reveals how important it is to consider writers separately instead of grouping them together under the virtual writer F All .
It can be shown that the size of the subsets heavily impacts the range of the likelihood ratios obtained, but does not significantly affect whether a likelihood ratio obtained for a given specimen supports the correct hypothesis. This last effect is shown in the confusion matrices in Table 4 . For small data set sizes, a signature can obtain contrasting LR values across repetitions. As more data is considered for estimation of population parameters, the LR converges to the one obtained using the entire data set, as in the previous section. This is mostly due to the fact that the maximum likelihood estimators are unreliable unless the size of the data set is sufficiently large.
A fully Bayesian analysis would heavily reduce this problem by leveraging on past data (represented by priors) as well as hypotheses on population parameters. However, the development of a fully Bayesian method is not straight-forward, and is out of scope of the current article.
Angles and slants
As stated in Section 4.3, angles and slants are highly dependent on the specific case. Moreover, within the collected authentic corpus it is not apparent how to define measures which are both angle-based and easy to extend to other kinds of signatures.
Another difficulty lies in the properties of the numerical domain where angles and slants lie. Common classifiers do not reliably work, and particular care is needed even to define the sample mean [36] . Circular statistics, and in particular Bayesian extensions, still pose many open research questions.
We nevertheless decided to briefly report our collected data, leaving the possibility to expand its analysis in future works, as suggested in Section 1.3.
Summary statistics are reported in Figs. 8 and 9 . Notice that angles and slants are much less clearly distributed than the absolute dimensions of signatures. Also, some keypoints are often missing Table 4 Sensitivity of the confusion matrices in Table 3 to subset size across 5 different comparison scenarios.LR denotes the likelihood ratio averaged over 10 trials for each chosen subset size.
Ground truth Subset size in the corpora (e.g., keypoint 9), which leads to the impossibility of measuring an angle or a slant. As a consequence of this interplay, in some cases we speculate that evidence provided by absolute angular measurements can be dominated by other characteristics, such as presence or absence of keypoints, or the impossibility to obtain angular measurements.
Proportions and distances
In this subsection, we explore a joint representation for the measures reported in Table 2 . Specifically, we focus on the measures D = D j 7 j=1 , as they do not suffer issues that characterize angles and slants.
Their distributions have been summarised in Fig. 10 . To isolate the most discriminant features, the article [21] proceeds with Boruta 
Writer Measure value Fig. 10 . Boxplots for all measures in Table 2. to the simplest MDS techniques. All MDS techniques map points to the lesser-dimensional space such that those who are most similar, they are represented as being closer, while points that are very dissimilar get spread far apart. Notice that MDS techniques work with unlabelled ("unsupervised") data.
In particular, we applied t-distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [37] : this technique is very powerful, well suited for high-dimensional databases, and it has been specifically conceived to map vectors from any space to a plane (R 2 ). However, it has some drawbacks: the convergence to a global optimum is not guaranteed, it is a stochastic method (hence results are not easily reproducible), and it does not provide a means to map a new point on a past representation. Furthermore, it is often difficult to interpret the learned characteristics, as they are non-linear and do not have a specific geometrical meaning (unlike other dimensional reduction techniques such as principal components).
The results of t-SNE have been represented in Fig. 11 : notice the intrinsic similarity between specimens produced by each forger. This gives us hope for obtaining a statistical model capable of distinguishing evidence from different forgers in future works.
Marquis' Fourier descriptors
The idea behind this approach is to decompose each closed loop as a Fourier series of harmonic components. Following Ref. [23] , from each closed loop we first extract the contour, we normalize its area 2 , we describe it in polar coordinates as q = f(h) (see Fig. 12 ) and we represent f with a Fourier series 3 :
The set of amplitudes and phases (A k , t k ) K k=k 0 forms the Fourier descriptors, which characterize the shape of the loop.
We chose to consider only harmonics with k ∈ {2, . . . , 5}, as A 1 is tied to the loop radius, and harmonics above k = 5 have a negligible effect on the shape. The distribution of amplitude coefficients across letters, writers and harmonic index is reported in Fig. 13 .
A number of observations can be made on Fourier descriptors. First of all, shape information can be properly described only by considering pairs (A k , t k ). All pairs are shown in Fig. 14, distinguishing by letter and writer. Notice the discriminative power of the third harmonic.
It is necessary to note that all t k s are affected by the same problems as the angles in Section 5.2. In fact, the t k s are not necessarily restricted to a small neighbourhood of some t 0 , but can easily assume any angle in the unit circle: this defeats methods based on small deviations from a common mean, or methods that do not wrap distributions around the unit circle. Consequently, rather than building a classifier as in Ref. [23] , in future works we will seek a representation of Fourier coefficients which is free from these issues. In particular, the Cartesian representation of Fourier descriptors lies in the Euclidean plane. We hence conjecture that (A k cos t k , A k sin t k ) can be modelled as samples from Gaussian bivariate distributions, whose parameters mainly depend on writers, letters and harmonic 2 The motivation behind area normalization is to be able to measure deviations from circular shapes rather than variations in scale. As a consequence, all loops have approximately the same mean radius, represented by the term A 1 . 3 To conform to the literature, we use a upper-case notation: the distinction between random variables and their realisations is left to the context. index. Based on these hypotheses, one can then apply the model described in Section 5.1 for each harmonic.
Similarly to keypoints, the presence or the absence of a loop can be a strong indicator for, or against, the authenticity of a signature. This is not directly expressed through Fourier coefficients, but will be nevertheless integrated into the Bayesian network by means of a binary node M, as stated in Section 1.3.
Discussion
So far, we presented brief insights on the capabilities of the corpora we collected. It is clear that future works will heavily exploit Bayesian multivariate statistical models. We expect that significant challenges will be posed by the study of individual characteristics.
In particular, the Bayesian approach on Fourier descriptors illustrated in Section 5.4 opens a number of research questions concerning the description of the joint distribution of harmonic coefficients. It is noteworthy that Fourier analysis appears in many different technical disciplines. Any progress achieved in this field could provide insight on the usage of Bayesian methods in other forensic domains such as spectroscopy or chemistry.
Another facet to be explored is the denominator of the likelihood ratio. As detailed in Section 5.1, its definition changes according to the relevant population that is accounted for (previously noted as F ).
As a consequence, one may introduce Bayesian mixture models and non-parametric methods to automatically evaluate the presence of several classes in the data.
The next challenge is posed by the construction of the Bayesian network. This phase will significantly exploit domain knowledge from forensic experts, in order to account for interdependence between features.
In general, there are no guidelines on how to construct a sensible network. However, there are a number of attempts in literature detailing individual aspects. As an example, a very recent study [34] related to Marquis' Fourier descriptors is available. Such study will serve us as a basis to integrate them into a more general framework. Moreover, in Section 1.3 we described the motivation behind the evaluation of missing evidence: this section will certainly benefit from techniques addressed to treat missing data.
A fundamental problem underlying the project is the very high data dimensionality. Forensic document examiners commonly work with very few specimens, so a good characterization of the distributions is often challenging. It is then imperative to integrate techniques to perform feature selection or dimensionality reduction. To this purpose we can also exploit domain knowledge from fingerprint comparison: specifically, one may aim at introducing a biometric score between individual characteristics in signatures. Such measure is one-dimensional, therefore drastically reducing data dimensionality and easing inferences through the Bayesian network.
A further extension of the work is the addition of new measures and new features. In particular, so far we only studied simple geometrical properties of signatures, while forensic experts commonly rely also on other types of evidence such as pressure variations, line quality and background information. Bayesian networks are easily extensible, requiring the specification of the conditional distributions for the desired feature, and the addition the node(s) to the network.
We also plan to collect new forgeries of the authentic corpus, as well as new corpora based on other signatures of different complexity. Specifically, this enables us to verify assumptions stated in Section 4.3 on universality of measures, and in Section 1.3 on casebased evidence. Moreover, with respect to Section 1.1, it also will help us to establish the feasibility of transposing the results from closed to open-set situations, where the relevant population is much larger. 
